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Abstract: China’s investment activities in Africa have attracted 
significant interest in academic, policy and media circles in the last 
decade. Adopting country case studies analysis, findings indicated 
that Chinese investment relations with Africa have its good, bad and 
ugly sides. On the good side, China has established special economic 
zones which have the potential to build economic linkages with the 
local economy. However, the linkages are mainly forward, involving 
logistics, forwarding, and insurance and financial services. Backward 
linkages are fostered to the extent that the Chinese firms contract out 
transportation and catering services for their employees and sub-
contract with local firms. The bad side includes the limited 
employment quota for local citizens, poor labour standard, limited 
technology transfer, and the quality of Chinese construction. The 
ugly side includes tax evasion and support to dictatorial regimes in 
Africa. Chinese companies should be well controlled and the 
legislation that guides their business conduct should be fully 
enforced. 
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1     Introduction 
 
China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa has attracted significant 
interest from academic, policy, and media circles in the last decade. The bulk of 
Chinese investment has been in commodities (principally oil) and minerals, but 
there have also been investments in natural raw materials such as sugar and 
timber. Chinese investment in infrastructure goes into telecommunications, 
while Chinese aid goes into construction of roads and railways as well as 
showpiece investments such as stadiums and government offices. In 
manufacturing, the bulk of historic Chinese investment has been in the clothing 
sector, but China has committed itself to large investments in industrial 
processing zones in a number of African economies. Chinese investment in the 
distributive trade sector is typically small scale and based on individual Chinese 
entrepreneurs engaged in retail trading. However, in some African economies 
Chinese wholesale traders have been active in serving regional neighbours 
(AERC, 2008). 
     China’s burgeoning trade and investment relationship with Africa does not 
benefit all sectors or countries equally. According to Schiere (2011), about 70% 
of Africa’s exports to China come from Angola, South Africa, Sudan, and the 
DRC, and are heavily dominated by raw materials (e.g. oil, copper, cobalt, and 
cotton). And 60% of imports from China, largely manufactures, are destined to 
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South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria and Morocco. Most other African 
economies have only a limited trade relationship with China. Chinese outward 
FDI to Africa shows a similar pattern of concentration, with 50% flowing to the 
mining sectors of just a handful of resource-rich countries (Nigeria, South 
Africa and Sudan). The Chinese government going global policies encourages 
overseas agricultural investment. However, outward investment in agriculture 
and related activities is much smaller than in mining or manufacturing 
(Brautigam, 2009). 
     The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) undertook a 
comprehensive analysis of the key features and patterns of the past, current, and 
future of the investment relations between China and specific African countries 
between 2009 and 2011, which formed the basis for better understanding the 
sector specific impact of these relationships. The AERC study also sought to 
understand the associated opportunities and challenges for the development 
prospects of specific African countries, as well as an articulation of the 
appropriate overall and sector-specific policy measures that these African 
countries may wish to take. The AERC studies also represent the recent set of 
information that can yield useful insights with respect to the China-Africa 
investment relationship. The common concern has been whether China’s Africa 
policy marks a significant change in Africa’s international economic and 
political relations. Consequently, it will be interesting to synthesize the findings 
of the project and make appropriate recommendations. Following this 
introductory section, section two presents stylized facts on China-Africa 
investment relationships while section three highlights the analytical framework 
to put the discussion into context. Insights into the AERC country case studies 
are discussed in section four. The synthesis of the findings of the country case 
studies are discussed in section five while section six concludes. 
 
 
2     Stylized facts on China-Africa investment relations 
 
China's outward FDI net flows in 2010 reached US$68.81 billion, increasing by 
21.7% compared to US$56.53 billion in the year 2009. Among the outflows, 
US$20.64 billion was incremental equity investment, US$24.01 billion was re-
invested earnings, and US$24.16 billion was other investment accounting for 
30%, 34.9% and 35.1% respectively of total outward FDI flows. In 2010, more 
than 13,000 domestic investing entities had established about 16,000 overseas 
enterprises in 178 countries (regions) globally. The accumulated outward FDI 
net stock volume stood at US$317.21 billion. Among the stock, US$59.73 
billion was equity investment, US$120.7 billion was re-invested earnings and 
US$136.78 billion was other investment accounting for 18.8%, 38.1% and 
43.1% respectively of the total. The total assets of foreign affiliates exceeded 
US$1.5 trillion (2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment). 
     Table 1 highlights China's outward FDI flows by region between 2004 and 
2010. The share of the African continent in China's Outward FDI flow 
witnessed a gradual increase between 2004 and 2008 until a decline of 
US$5490.55 million in 2008 to US$1438.87 million in 2009. This could be 
attributed to the global financial crisis witnessed in 2008. However, the 
investment level increased to US$2111.99 in 2010. A clearer picture of China's 
outward FDI flows by region is depicted in Figure 1. The bulk of the outward 
Chinese FDI is concentrated in Asia. In the year 2008, Asia accounted for 77% 
of total FDI outflow. This however declined to 71.48% and 65.23% in 2009 and 
2010 respectively. After the year 2005, the percentage share of Europe declined 
and Latin America recorded a massive inflow of China-Africa outward FDI 
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making the region the second largest recipients of China outward investment 
except in 2008 when Africa ranked second. 
 




2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 5497.99 12261.17 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 
Asia 3013.99 4484.17 7633.25 16593.15 43547.50 40407.59 44890.46 
Africa  317.43 391.68 519.86 1574.31 5490.55 1438.87 2111.99 
Europe 2046.77 2166.65 597.71 1540.43 875.79 3352.72 6760.19 
Latin 
America 
1762.72 6466.16 8468.74 4902.41 3677.25 7327.90 10538.27 
North 
America 
126.49 320.84 258.05 1125.71 364.21 1521.93 2621.44 
Oceania 120.15 202.83 126.36 770.08 1951.87 2479.98 1888.96 
Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
 
Figure 1     Percentage share of outward Chinese FDI by region (2004-2005) 
 
 
A breakdown of Chinese outward FDI flows to African countries is highlighted 
in Table 2. The top five recipient economies of Chinese outward investment in 
Africa between 2004 and 2010 were South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Zambia, 
and Congo DR. A breakdown of Chinese outward FDI flows is provided in 
Table 3, which shows that investment cuts across different sectors such as 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction, scientific research, and water 
conservancy, among others. The top six sectors that received Chinese 
investment are leasing and business service; mining; banking; wholesale and 
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Table 2     China's outward FDI flows by country, 2004-2010 (millions of US$) 
 
Country/Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total 5497.99 12261.17 17633.97 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 
Algeria 11.21 84.87 98.93 145.92 42.25 228.76 186.00 
Angola 0.18 0.47 22.39 41.19 9.57 8.31 101.11 
Benin 13.77 1.31 -- 6.32 14.56 0.09 1.76 
Botswana 0.27 3.69 2.76 1.87 14.06 18.44 43.85 
Burundi -- -- -- -- -- 0.69 -- 
Cameroon 0.37 0.19 0.73 2.05 1.69 0.82 14.88 
Cape Verde -- 0.32 0.23 0.09 0.48 -- 0.46 
Central African -- -- -- -- -- -- 25.81 
Chad -- 2.71 1.61 0.75 9.47 51.21 2.13 
Comoros -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.01 
Congo DR 11.91 5.07 36.73 57.27 23.99 227.16 236.19 
Congo 0.51 8.11 13.24 2.50 9.79 28.07 34.38 
Cote D'Ivoire 6.75 8.74 2.91 1.74 7.02 1.51 5.02 
Djibouti -- -- -- 1.00 -- 3.40 4.23 
Egypt 5.72 13.31 8.85 24.98 14.57 133.86 51.65 
Equ. Guinea 1.69 6.35 10.19 12.82 4.86 20.88 22.08 
Eritrea -- -- 0.01 0.45 0.49 0.23 2.94 
Ethiopia 0.43 4.93 23.95 13.28 9.71 74.29 58.53 
Gabon 5.60 2.08 5.53 3.31 32.05 11.88 23.44 
Gambia -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Ghana 0.34 2.57 0.50 1.85 10.99 49.35 55.98 
Guinea 14.44 16.34 0.75 13.20 8.32 26.98 9.74 
Kenya 2.68 2.05 0.18 8.90 23.23 28.12 101.22 
Lesotho 0.03 0.60 -- -- 0.62 0.10 0.56 
Liberia 0.58 8.65 7.03 -- 2.56 1.12 29.89 
Libya Arab Jm 0.06 0.25 8.51 42.26 10.54 38.55 10.50 
Madagascar 13.64 0.14 1.17 13.24 61.16 42.56  
Malawi -- -- -- 0.20 5.44 -- 9.86 
Mali -- -- 2.60 6.72 1.28 7.99 3.05 
Mauritania 0.09 0.36 4.78 4.98 0.65 6.53 5.77 
Mauritius 0.44 2.04 16.59 15.58 34.44 14.12 22.01 
Morocco 1.80 0.85 1.78 2.64 6.88 16.42 1.75 
Mozambique 0.66 2.88 -- 10.03 5.85 15.85 0.28 
Namibia -- 0.18 0.85 0.91 7.59 11.62 5.51 
Niger 1.53 5.76 7.94 100.83 0.01 39.87 196.25 
Nigeria 45.52 53.30 67.79 390.35 162.56 171.86 184.89 
Rwanda -- 1.42 2.99 0.41 12.88 8.62 12.72 
Sao Tome and Principe -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.02 
Senegal -- -- -- 0.24 3.60 11.04 18.96 
Seychelles -- 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.36 12.28 
Sierra Leone 5.92 0.49 3.71 2.85 11.42 0.90 -- 
South Africa 17.81 47.47 40.74 454.41 4807.86 41.59 411.17 
Sudan 146.70 91.13 50.79 65.40 63.14 19.30 30.96 
Tanzania 1.62 0.96 12.54 3.82 18.22 21.58 25.72 
Togo 1.62 0.31 4.58 2.70 4.20 8.91 11.77 
Tunisia 0.22 -- 1.73 0.34 -- 1.30 0.29 
Uganda 0.15 0.17 0.23 4.01 6.70 1.29 26.50 
Zambia 2.23 10.09 87.44 119.34 213.97 111.80 75.05 
Zimbabwe 0.71 1.47 3.42 12.57 0.72 11.24 33.80 
Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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Table 3     Distribution of China's outward FDI flows by industry, 2004-2010 (millions US$) 
 
Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture, Forestry, 
Husbandry, and Fishing 288.66 105.36 185.04 271.71 171.83 342.79 533.98 
Mining 1800.21 1675.22 8539.51 4062.77 5823.51 13343.09 5714.86 
Manufacturing 755.55 2280.40 906.61 2126.50 1766.03 2240.97 4664.17 
Production and Supply of 
Electricity, Gas, and Water 78.49 7.66 118.74 151.38 1313.49 468.07 1006.43 
Construction 47.95 81.86 33.23 329.43 732.99 360.22 1628.26 
Transport, Storage and Post 828.66 576.79 1376.39 4065.48 2655.74 2067.52 5655.45 
Information Transmission, 
Computer Services and Software 30.50 14.79 48.02 303.84 298.75 278.13 506.12 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 799.69 2260.12 1113.91 6604.18 6514.13 6135.75 6728.78 
Lodging and Catering Services 2.03 7.58 2.51 9.55 29.50 74.87 218.20 
Banking  -- -- 3529.99 1667.80 14048.00 8733.74 8627.39 
Real Estate 8.51 115.63 383.76 908.52 339.01 938.14 1613.08 
Leasing and Business Service 749.31 4941.59 4521.66 5607.34 21717.23 20473.78 30280.70 
Scientific Research, Technical 
Service and Geological 
Prospecting 18.06 129.42 281.61 303.90 166.81 775.73 1018.86 
Water Conservancy, 
Environment and Public 
Facilities Management 1.20 0.13 8.25 2.71 141.45 4.34 71.98 
Services to Households and 
Other Services 88.14 62.79 111.51 76.21 165.36 267.73 321.05 
Education -- -- 2.28 8.92 1.54 2.45 2.00 
Health, Social Security and 
Social Welfare 0.01 -- 0.18 0.75 0.00 1.91 33.52 
Culture, Sports and 
Entertainment 0.98 0.12 0.76 5.10 21.80 19.76 186.48 
Public Management and Social 
Organization 0.04 1.71 -- -- -- -- -- 
Total 5497.99 12261.17 26506.09 26506.09 55907.17 56528.99 68811.31 
Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment. 
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3     Analytical framework 
 
The China-Africa investment relations are highlighted within the framework of 
Dunning’s eclectic model. This model was deemed appropriate because it 
addresses the key aspects of the investment relations. The general thrust of the 
model is that there are at least three sets of advantages that influence the 
decisions of multinationals to invest abroad. These advantages are ownership 
(O), locational (L) and internalization (I) advantages. These advantages have 
been labelled the OLI paradigm. The O advantages provide justification for why 
some firms go abroad to invest. These advantages guarantee that such firms will 
succeed investing abroad because they enjoy some firm-specific advantages that 
will allow them to overcome the costs of operating in a foreign country. Such 
ownership-specific or firm-specific advantages are normally intangible and can 
be transferred within the multinational enterprise at low cost. The O advantages 
guarantee higher revenue and/or lower costs that can offset the costs of 
operating at a distance in a foreign location. Hence, undertaking FDI is 
premised on the condition that a firm has developed strong and specific 
characteristics that enable it to be competitive in the home market. It is 
presumed that such characteristics must be transferable abroad and strong 
enough to compensate for the extra costs and barriers of doing business abroad 
(Dunning 1988). 
     Given that the O advantages by themselves are not a guarantee to justify 
foreign production, FDI is also explained by the countries’ (where a firm 
(MNE) intend to invest) locational (L) advantages. These L advantages are 
relevant because they compensate for the usual handicaps of foreign production. 
L advantages relate to a number of fundamental factors that are often shaped by 
the host country’s comparative advantage, also referred to as transactional cost 
advantage (Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova 1998). For example, a pool of 
cheap labour constitutes a locational factor for labour intensive production that 
will attract FDI into a country. The presence of a series of incentives such as tax 
holidays and duty concessions also constitute L advantages (Oyeranti et al., 
2010). 
     The last set of advantages in this model is referred to as the internalization (I) 
advantages. I advantages explain why a firm would, for instance, choose to 
serve a foreign market through FDI rather than pursue alternative modes of 
operation without ownership control of a foreign activity. When these 
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licensing or exporting as it allows investors to expand and exploit opportunities 
more efficiently abroad and without concern for their trade secrets being 
compromised. Markusen (1995) argues that, because internalization focuses on 
characteristics of knowledge capital as opposed to physical capital, by investing 
directly rather than through licensing, the firm is able to eliminate or minimize 
risk of disclosing its trade secrets (Oyeranti, et al., 2010). 
     Beyond the theoretically-oriented eclectic model of FDI, Kaplinsky (2010) 
offered a pragmatic and operational methodological framework for the impact 
analysis of China on African economies. This framework is particularly useful 
for gleaning and tracking the competitive and complementary impacts of FDI 
from China as well as the direct and indirect impacts of Chinese FDI in Africa. 
This framework (Table 1) is designed to gain insight into the various channels 
through which the Chinese economies interact with the global economy in 
general and the low economies of Africa in particular. 
     The direct impacts of complementary activities of Chinese investment is 
readily seen in terms of cheap and appropriate capital goods, technology 
transfer, integration in global value chains, and low cost infrastructure. By 
contrast, complementary indirect impacts are more difficult to find and measure 
because of the problem with generalizing across countries and sectors. The 
direct impact of Chinese competitive behaviour is seen in the displacement of 
existing and potential local producers, less spin-off to local economy than other 
foreign contractors, and use of scarce resources. The indirect nature is witnessed 
in the competition for global FDI and production platforms, and disinvestment 
and relocation by other foreign investors (Table 1). 
 
Table 1     A synthetic framework for assessing the impact of China on Africa 
 








 • Chinese FDI in Africa 
• Cheap and appropriate capital 
goods 
• Technology transfer 
• Integration in global value 
chains 







e • Displacement of existing and 
potential local producers 
• Less spin-off to local economy 
than other foreign contractors 
• Use of scarce resources 
• Competition for global FDI and 
production platforms 
• Disinvestment and relocation by 
other foreign investors (e.g 
clothing and furniture) 
Source: Kaplinsky, McCormick, and Morris (2010). 
 
Kaplinsky’s framework recognizes four primary types of FDI: 
 
• Those designed to satisfy a particular foreign market or set of foreign 
markets, viz. market seeking or demand oriented FDI. 
• Those designed to gain access to natural resources, e.g., minerals, 
agricultural products, unskilled labour, viz. resource seeking or supply 
oriented FDI 
• Those designed to promote a more efficient division of labour or 
specialization of an existing portfolio of foreign and domestic assets by 
MNEs, i.e., rationalized or efficiency seeking FDI. This type of FDI though 
related to the first or second kind, is usually sequential to it. 
• Those designed to protect or augment the existing owner specific advantages 
of the investing firms and/or to reduce those of their competitors, i.e., 
strategic asset seeking FDI. 
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Given that Chinese outward investment clearly fits into the resource seeking and 
market seeking investment context of Chinese FDI in Africa and other 
developing economies, this framework is placed at the centre of the impact 
analysis of Chinese FDI in Africa. 
 
 
4     Methodology 
 
A case study approach, using secondary research, is used for this study. The 
case study is the most flexible of all research designs, allowing the researcher to 
retain the holistic characteristics of real-life events while investigating empirical 
events. In general, a case study is an empirical inquiry which investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple 
sources of evidence are used. The case study is the method of choice when the 
phenomenon under study is not readily distinguishable from its environment 
(Yin, 2003). 
     This paper’s case studies present data on how African countries have been 
affected positively and negatively with respect to their investment relations with 
China. The reviewed country case studies reveal the implications of China 
investment relations with respect to the labour market, impact of Chinese 
investment on domestic investment and firms, the features of the Chinese 
investment in Africa, the impact of the Chinese investment on the domestic 
markets, and the quality of the Chinese investment. This is then utilized to 
present a synthesis to describe the China-Africa investment relationship. In-
depth analysis of eight African countries was undertaken in the AERC country 
case studies, including: Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Zambia, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, and Sudan. In addition to the country case studies, the 
study also utilizes relevant existing evidence to support the claims made in the 




5     Insights from AERC country case studies and existing evidence 
 
The analytical framework presents the analysis under broad headings detailing 
each countries experience. This is to allow better insight into the China-Africa 
investment relations. 
 
5.1     Implications on labour market 
 
Employment. Chinese investors are required to comply with private investment 
laws of the African countries where they are operating, which includes meeting 
employment quotas from the local workforce. Chinese investors often flout this 
law, preferring instead to bring in Chinese expatriates to Africa. For example, 
Kiala and Corking (2009) noted that the Angola Private Investment Law which 
Chinese investors are required to comply with includes a limitation placed on 
the number of expatriates that a company is allowed to employ. However, they 
noted that it is difficult to confirm whether these rules are respected by foreign 
investors and/or whether they are regulated by Angolan authorities. What is 
clear though is that the arrangement made with the Chinese government 
(representing the interests of the Chinese construction companies) not only 
contradicts certain principles of the Angolanisation campaign, but also differs 
from the practice for other international construction companies operating in 
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Angola. The Chinese construction companies barely employ even 30% of locals 
(Kiala and Corking (2009). 
     This evidence was supported by China’s Ambassador to Angola Zhang 
Bolun who noted that as of March 2009, China had 50 large firms and another 
50 smaller firms operating in Angola. These firms reportedly employ a total of 
approximately 50,000 Chinese expatriates in Angola. However, this figure is 
disputable since the Angolan embassy in Beijing reportedly issued more than 
40,000 working visas to Chinese nationals in 2008 alone (Kiala and Corkin, 
2009). There is even the claim on whether any of these visas were renewals of 
existing permits or the intended duration of stay was for each of the passport 
holders. In some cases, the workers generally come to Angola on two-year 
contracts, after which they either return to China where they remain or choose to 
renew their permits. Also, it can be inferred that the overwhelming majority of 
the Chinese expatriates working in Angola are employed on aid infrastructure 
development projects, as opposed to Chinese companies that have invested 
there. Chinese FDI tends to also have a noticeable trickling of Chinese small 
and micro enterprises such as Chinese-made construction materials, household 
appliances and other fast-moving consumer goods, and internet cafés in Angola. 
Most of the operations are minor business ventures, predominantly in the retail 
sector, but also increasingly in the restaurant business. The issue with most 
Chinese small and micro enterprises, especially micro enterprises, is that they 
are family-owned and most likely employ very few local staff. Consequently, 
the constraint to the Angolan government will be its capacity to enforce 
employment equity. Thus, it can be deduced that Chinese investment possesses 
a poor record of employment creation in Angola. 
     A similar experience was reported in Mauritius by Ancharaz and 
Nowbutsing (2010). It was revealed that Tianli Spinning (Mauritius) Ltd., a 
Chinese textile firm, employed some 450 workers at the end of 2008, of which 
only 58 were local. This kind of heavy dependence on Chinese labour is typical 
of Chinese firms operating in Mauritius, particularly in the construction sector. 
The implication is that the economic impact of Chinese FDI on the host 
economy is reduced. Also, in the case of the Jin Fei project (a major Chinese 
industrial zone in Mauritius), the government, when presenting the project, 
claimed that it would lead to the creation of some 43,000 jobs out of which 
34,000 will come directly to the locals. However, when pressed by the 
opposition political parties and the press, the government conceded that only 
10% to 15% of the jobs would accrue to Mauritians. In addition, the 
construction of the industrial zone, currently under way, is utilizing a large 
number of Chinese expatriate workers. Oyeranti et al. (2010) observed that 
Chinese firms in Nigeria have been criticized for being closed during this period 
of construction because they hardly employ the local workforce. 
     The remuneration package for the local workers in most Chinese firms is 
also much below the industry standard. For example, in Ethiopia, the 
remuneration to the local labour is far below the standard expected from 
construction activities undertaken by Chinese contractors. In addition, there are 
few employment opportunities for local unskilled labourers in cases where there 
are big construction projects (Geda and Meske, 2010). This particular finding 
was corroborated by Kamwanga and Koyi (2009) in Zambia, who observed 
cases of Chinese firms favouring Chinese employment over local employment, 
and poor working conditions, which have led to political agitation. Another 
observation from these case studies is that in countries where the local people 
are employed more than the Chinese, the designations of the local people are 
usually limited to low-level positions, such as messengers, clerks, or store-
keepers. For example, while Netting Company (a net making Chinese firm) in 
Ghana employed 3 Chinese nationals and 22 Ghanaians, the Chinese held the 
senior management positions of chief operating officer (COO), chief executive 
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officer (CEO), and Director; and the Ghanaians were senior sales managers, 
stock-keepers, messengers, and carrier boys (Tsikata, et al., 2010). Similar case 
studies in Sudan show better employment of local labour; this is attributed to the 
stringent employment policies enforced by the Sudanese government (Suliman 
and Badawi, 2010). 
 
Labour standard. With respect to a minority of Chinese projects, it is reported 
that Chinese labour is very much below the international standard (in categories 
such as security, sanitation, and water supply facilities). For example, in 
Zambia, it was reported that Chinese firms often disregard local labour and 
environmental considerations. In one case workers in Chinese owned mines 
bemoaned the low wages and poor working conditions (Kamwanga and Koyi, 
2009). In Nigeria, there are submissions that the Chinese do maltreat their 
workers. According to a report, the conditions of employment for Nigerians in 
Chinese firms neither conform with the Nigeria Labour Laws nor to that of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO). It was reported that Chinese 
companies such as Wahum Nigeria Ltd. and Galvanizing Company Ltd. are 
firms with the most inhuman working conditions, such as12-hour  shifts and 
limiting most workers to casual terms of employment. Also, there is the 
infamous report on the the Chinese-owned factory in Lagos which burnt down 
in September, 2002,  while 40 Nigerians were trapped inside due to being 
locked-in by a foreman; one wonders how reasonable, if any, was the 
compensation given to the victim’s families (Oyeranti et al., 2010)? 
 
Box 1: Magbass activities in Sierra Leone 
 
China’s Magbass sugar project in Sierra Leone shows some of the challenges 
African communities are likely to face from large-scale Chinese agricultural 
investment in Africa. Built by China between 1977 and 1982, Magbass was 
the first aid project to transition directly into Chinese management after 
completion. After 1982, the state-owned Complant managed the 1,280 
hectare complex for the government until war drove them out in 1996. In 
2003, just after the end of the war, Sierra Leone tried to privatize many state-
owned assets. There were few takers, but Complant – now listed on the 
Shanghai stock exchange and one of China’s 100 top state-owned companies 
– signed a lease to renovate, expand, and manage the remote sugar complex, 
this time for profit. Did the Chinese government direct Complant to make this 
investment? “Complant did the research, they made the decision,” China’s 
ambassador in Freetown, Cheng Wenju, asserted. “We can’t order them to 
come.” Complant’s experience illustrates the rocky road traveled by Chinese 
companies carrying out the policy that former aid projects now be sustained 
by enterprises, not by aid. 
     It also foreshadows some of the conflicts that are likely to arise for 
China’s less experienced investors, when they “go down to the country side” 
in Africa. Magbass provided a lot of benefits for the country. In the high 
season, the complex had the capacity to employ up to 1,500 people from the 
district of Tonkolili, a rare opportunity for paid work in the hinterland. 
Several hundred skilled people found permanent jobs as electricians, 
plumbers, carpenters, and clerks, and local people reported that they had 
acquired new skills. The top jobs at Magbass were held by about thirty-three 
Chinese staff, although in 2007 the factory sent six of the more senior local 
employees to China for training, to support a planned reduction in the 
Chinese staff. 
     Basic wages were low. The contract signed with the government 
stipulated that Magbass would respect the country’s labour laws, but that they 
would set wages based on “the lowest wage standard in the region.” In 2006, 
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the second full year of operation, participants in a focus group organized for a 
World Bank study said that the Chinese paid only US$1.62 per day. This was 
actually higher than the US$1.26 paid by local farms, but the youth in the 
focus groups reported that they were being asked to pay “tips” of about 
US$18 to land a position at Magbass. After a series of strikes in the third 
year, Complant raised wages to about US$2.19 per day. “Now the workers 
are happy,” K. B. J. Conteh, vice-president of the Sierra Leone Labour 
Congress told me. “During the production season, some will earn 300,000 
leones [US$101] a month.” When asked him about wildcat strikes at 
Magbass, Conteh elaborated, "Formerly there was thieving, even on the 
managing board. Now, there is no thieving. It is too difficult. They employ a 
security company. The people were saying: if you don’t want us to thieve, 
pay us better. That was the whole problem.” 
 
Source: Brautigam, D. 2009. The dragon’s gift: the real story of China in 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
5.2     Impact on domestic investment and firms  
 
Technology transfer. Beyond the involvement of indigenous entrepreneurs at 
the management level, local expertise and other workforce are the channels 
through which technology is transferred and technological capacity is 
developed. Technology transfer from Chinese investment companies operating 
in Africa is not only limited but also not encouraging. For example, in Angola, 
technology transfer in the construction sector is difficult to measure with the 
workforce remaining predominantly foreign. Similarly, in the case of Mauritius, 
it is difficult to assess the extent of knowledge spillovers that Tianli Spinning 
(Mauritius) Ltd. has generated. These are likely to be small and limited to 
knowledge acquired by local workers through training and experience, which 
are transferable and so can benefit other firms (Ancharaz, and Nowbutsing, 
2010). 
     In the few cases that the Chinese have attempted to train workers, the 
Chinese investors exposed them to only the basic rudiments of the technology, 
preferring instead to import their skilled human resources. For example, in 
response to complaints by Nigeria’s Minister of Science and Technology, 
Huwaei Technologies Nigeria Ltd., a Chinese FDI, established a training centre 
in Nigeria to train 2000 telecoms engineers per annum. Perhaps the technology 
transfer from Chinese FDI to Africa is insignificant because most of the Chinese 
firms bring finished products into the country and complete equipment with 
Chinese technicians. In Zambia it was observed that Chinese mining companies 
are increasingly relying on leasing heavy equipment rather than procuring new 
ones. The problem with this practice is that it limits the extent of technology 
transfer because, as the equipment is not an asset of the company, the incentive 
to develop capacity to harness the associated technology is minimal. 
 
Backward and forward linkages with domestic economies. Chinese FDI in 
Africa cuts across many different sectors such as construction industry, 
agriculture, textile industry (more precisely into spinning operations), but the 
bulk of Chinese investments in Africa is found in resource seeking that does not 
feedback into the local economy. For example, in Mauritius, construction 
materials are mainly imported from China. This reduces the multiplier effect of 
the initial FDI while accentuating the already heavy bilateral trade deficit vis-à-
vis China. Also, special economic zones (SEZs) set up by China produce 
primarily for the export market. Since the enterprises are wholly Chinese-
owned, the bulk of the export proceeds are remitted to their home country. 
Consequently, the impact on foreign exchange earnings will be minimal 
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(Ancharaz and Nowbutsing, 2010). Some of the Chinese investments in critical 
areas (telecommunications, water, electricity, housing, etc.) of the Nigerian 
economy have high social contents. However, there are reservations about the 
activities of Chinese investors, especially those who are engaged in 
manufacturing. Such complaints include sharp practices such as importation and 
production of sub-standard products, and lack of respect for their workers. Also, 
because Chinese firms in Nigeria bring in inputs from their own country and set 
up their own market outlets, it implies that there may not be any (or major) 
backward and forward linkages between Nigerian and Chinese firms (Oyeranti 
et al., 2010). 
 
Investment relations with domestic firms. Chinese firms often have 
connections with  the Chinese government—political muscle—which can be 
used to crowd out domestic competition. For example, Chinese firms that won 
big contracts are seen remaining in Ethiopia by opening offices and local 
subsidiaries of their company after their first project with the country (Geda and 
Meske, 2010). Similarly, the competition between Chinese firms and domestic 
firms are considered unfair in Ghana because of the significant number of 
Chinese investors that come into the country with capital provided by the 
Chinese government (Tsikata, 2010). 
     Kamwanga and Koyi (2009) documented a case of a moribund textile factory 
jointly owned between Zambia and China. The company employed local 
farmers who provided inputs to the factory while also tending to their farming 
activities. However, the factory soon ran into trouble as it could not compete 
with imported fabric from China and subsequently closed. With the collapse of 
the factory, prospects of incorporating local production into the global value 
chain were lost. The closing down of the factory had wide ranging impacts, 
including depriving the farmers a source of income, as they had no market for 
their produce and were consequently forced to close shop. Other small scale 
suppliers of goods and services to the factory faced a similar fate. Without a 
factory to process cotton, most of it was instead exported in its raw form, further 
entrenching the raw material enclave status of the country. Consequently, the 
importation of Chinese textile products had a knockdown effect on the local 
fabric industry, which could not stand the flood of cheaper and better quality 
fabric from China. The negative effects of the Chinese imports increased the 
local’s resentment of Chinese firms. 
     Another example in Zambia is seen in Chinese investors’ participation in 
economic activities that are normally the prerogative of indigenes: he Chinese 
provided assistance to the Lusaka Council to upgrade the Kamwala trading 
center, which included the construction of new shops. The terms of the project 
were such that the Chinese would use some of the facilities for an agreed period 
of time in lieu of payment. After completion, Chinese traders started operating 
from the new premises, much to the displeasure of the local population, who 
protested that they had been displaced from their original shops. This act 
attracted widespread apprehension from the locals. There has also been a major 
surge in the number of Chinese companies registered in Zambia. While the early 
wave of Chinese firms establishing bases in Zambia were investment entities, 
there has been a new wave of service-related Chinese firms being established in 
the recent period. These service-related firms come in to operate as sources of 
inputs to Chinese Investors. This has raised concern among stakeholders who 
fear that local supply companies will lose out to Chinese services firms. This 
development is feared to further weaken the linkages between Chinese investors 
and local companies (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). 
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Box 2: Weak corporate social responsibility 
 
As an aid project, the Chinese had a clinic and a doctor who treated local 
villagers, they supplied housing for local workers, and they were more 
generous with bags of sugar for the local chiefs. However, “Those who are 
here now, they are businessmen. These Chinese have come to find money.” In 
early 2007, the Nobel-prize winning organization Me´dicins Sans Frontiers 
complained that runoff from the Magbass complex ran straight into the Rokel 
River, contributing to an outbreak of cholera. Some landowners argued that the 
sugar company had a responsibility to provide more social benefits for the 
community. And local people were deeply concerned that their government 
had agreed to give the Chinese company another 1,000 hectares of land. In 
December 2008, on my way to a meeting at the Ministry of Agriculture, I 
passed a man addressing a group of farmers milling outside the deputy 
permanent secretary’s office. Later, I learned that this delegation represented 
some of the landowners from the villages near the sugarcane plantation and 
factory at Magbass. The next day, the farmers were still there, and I eventually 
met with them. A landowner from Rochain village explained to me, “We have 
come to tell the government what we want: schools and scholarships for the 
children, medical facilities, water supply, and roads. The Chinese should do 
that. They should also clear farms for the landowners.” Another farmer cut in, 
“It is forbidden to cut sugarcane without their permission! You will go to 
prison, even though the land was taken without our consent.” 
     The villagers were asking that the Chinese be better corporate citizens, 
invest in social development projects, deliver social services that the local 
government was failing to provide. I remembered the parting comments of the 
high-level civil servant, a native of the Magbass area, “When our parents were 
farming on that land they could educate us, send us to university, but since 
they came in 1977 and took our land, no one can say, ‘That is the house I have 
built, that is the child I have educated.’ I have been to China: I went on a 
seminar for one month. I saw how they are judiciously managing their 
resources; they are very careful there. We would not like them to come here 
and exploit us.” 
 
Source: Brautigam, D. 2009. The dragon’s gift: the real story of China in 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
5.3     Features of Chinese investment 
 
Ownership structure of Chinese investment. The ownership structure of 
Chinese investment in Africa varies across countries: some are joint ventures, 
some are wholly Chinese owned, others are a mixture of both. For example, the 
Chinese investment in Ethiopia has been growing since the year 2000 and takes 
two modalities of investment: joint venture and wholly Chinese owned 
investment. Regarding the style, the ministry noted that most of the Chinese 
firm’s are privately owned by Chinese themselves. They prefer to work alone 
instead of joint venture mainly due to skill gaps. work attitude, and cultural 
differences. Some of the firms have a capital level of up to 10 million USD 
(Geda and Meske, 2010). In Zambia, Chinese investments are carried out 
largely by state-owned enterprises or joint ventures. For example, due to limited 
investment in plant and machinery and the constant breakdown of the 
Mulungushi textile factory, the Chinese offered to run it as a joint facility in a 
bid to help the Zambian Government keep the textile factory afloat. During 
what would be termed as a dramatic event, the factory was closed when the 
Chinese President was visiting the country. The President was greeted with anti-
Chinese protests, whereupon he suggested that the factory be run as a joint 
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facility. The Qingdao Textile Corporation then acquired a 66% stake in the firm 
(Lindberg, 2009 cited in Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). Most Chinese firms in 
Ghana are wholly-owned by the Chinese. This however varies from sector to 
sector. For example, out of the 63 general trade businesses established between 
1994 and 2007 with some level of Chinese investment, 57 (90%) were wholly-
owned by Chinese. On the other hand, out of the 105 manufacturing businesses 
established in the same time period, 48 (46%) were wholly-owned by Chinese 
(Tsikata, et al., 2010). 
 
Setting up of special economic zones. China’s decision to set up the SEZs 
reflects an appreciation by the Chinese government that most of Africa now 
present a host of domestic conditions conducive to FDI. Part of the underlying 
objective for setting up a SEZ is because China wishes to penetrate local 
African markets with a view to exploiting fully the untapped potential. The SEZ 
in Mauritius is the second of its kind to be set up across the African continent 
following the one established in the Zambian mining town of Chambishi in 
February, 2009 (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). In terms of manufacturing 
investment, the largest project is the Chambishi Multi-Facility Economic Zone 
(MFEZ) on the Copperbelt of Zambia. The targeted investment package to 
complete this industrial park is US$ 800 million. This zone is anchored by a 
US$ 200 million copper smelter, but is also meant to manufacture TVs, mobile 
phones and other electronic items (Carmody and Hampwaye, 2009). 
     The Kajola Specialized Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone is a joint venture 
of the Ogun State Government and the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction 
Company (CCECC) in Nigeria. The Zone is a strategic decision by the Ogun 
State government to take maximum advantage of the Railway Modernization 
Programme and the proposed Inland Container Terminal Project of the Federal 
Government. The aim is to attract specialized industries and businesses offering 
complementary services to these two projects of the Federal Government. The 
company’s investment was estimated at about US$ 715 million. The 
government envisioned that the project would facilitate rapid industrialization of 
the state and deepen foreign direct investment inflow to the state (Oyeranti et 
al., 2010). Other free trade zones in Nigeria involving the Chinese include Ogun 
Guangdong Free Trade Zone (OGFTZ), Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited, and the 
Lekki Free Trade Zone. 
 
Information on Chinese investment in Africa. Chinese investment in Africa is 
hardly open. For example, in Mauritius, the Jin Fei project necessitated an initial 
investment of US$1 billion. It covers 362 hectares of land in the region of Riche 
Terre, close to the seaport. The terms of the Framework Agreement for Jin Fei 
Project in Mauritius contain a clause of confidentiality, as required by the 
Chinese investors. Consequently, little information is available on the specifics 
of the project. One observer aptly noted that Chinese projects are not normally 
based on any feasibility study. They have their own way of doing business. 
They invest money, take over space and wait for enterprises to be set up 
(Ancharaz and Nowbutsing, 2010). Similarly, in Ghana according to Tsikata 
(2010), the major constraints to additional investment faced by the Netting 
Company largely stem from lack of transparency with regards to labour, tax and 
VAT policies. 
 
Nature of Chinese investment in Africa. The structural characteristic of the 
host economy is a significant factor on the type/nature of Chinese investment in 
that country: investment is resource seeking in some countries, market seeking 
others. In addition, Chinese outward FDI is often associated with some pull 
factors such as a host country's favourable investment policies, including 
incentives and other location-specific advantages. Hence, China is fond of 
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extracting extremely generous terms for its investment outside the resource 
seeking activities. 
     In the case of Zambia, Chinese FDI is primarily resource seeking and 
secondarily market seeking. The observed increased interest by the Chinese in 
Africa is mostly driven by the China’s need for natural resources, which is vital 
for its continued economic growth. The bulk of Chinese investments in Zambia 
are thus related to the mining industry. The two by far largest investments 
registered by ZDA are a US$199 million investment by China's Nonferrous 
Metal Mining and Yunnan Copper Industry in 2006 in the Chambishi Copper 
Smelter, and a US$220 million investment in 2007 by the Jinchuan Group 
Mining Corporation in the Munali nickel project. The largest Chinese-owned 
mine in Zambia is the Chambishi copper, which was acquired by state owned 
enterprise (SOE) China Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFC-A) in 1998, 
making it China’s first overseas non-ferrous mine (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). 
Investments at a total of US$150 million were made in the mine between 1998 
and 2003. Carmody (2009) noted that following the investment in the 
Chambishi mine, Zambian exports to China rose seventeen-fold between 2002 
and 2006 (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). 
     Tsikata et al., (2010) noted that Chinese investment in Ghana is primarily 
market-seeking. The target market is the domestic market and the West African 
sub-region. Chinese investors view Ghana as a good hub to export to 
neighboring West African countries. However, a significant portion of the 
Chinese goods are high-end consumer goods like computers, compact discs and 
DVDs. A small fraction of Chinese FDI is resource-seeking. These investments 
tend to be in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors. However, the discovery 
of oil in Ghana might possibly lead to increased resource-seeking FDI from 
China. Officials at the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) have 
already fielded interest from Chinese hoping to invest in the extraction and 
processing sectors and also in provision of support services and equipment. The 
level of eventual involvement of the Chinese in the oil sector will depend on 
geopolitical considerations and the competitiveness of their firms in comparison 
to those from the West (Tsikata et al., 2010). 
     However, the focus of Chinese investment in Nigeria is in the extractive 
industries, which is of strategic interest to China (Oyeranti et al., 2010). Giving 
the list of private FDI and the sectoral concentration, efficiency may not be the 
driving force of inflow of Chinese FDI in the Nigerian economy. The list of 
public FDI in Nigeria suggests resource-seeking motive. Similarly, in Sudan, 
the bulk of FDI is committed by the Chinese SOEs attracted to crude oil 
production and oil export infrastructure. It is not clear whether these firms were 
incorporated in China or established by migrants, i.e., Chinese workers in 
Sudan. Crude oil is the most important product of the Chinese companies in 
Sudan (Suliman and Badawi, 2010). In the case of Ethiopia, FDI from China is 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector (over 60%) which is different from 
what happened in other African countries where the Chinese FDI is pretty much 
resource seeking (Geda and Meske, 2010). 
 
5.4     Quality of Chinese investment in Africa 
 
Complementarities versus competitiveness of Chinese investment. The 
investment laws in a country are the major factor that indicates whether Chinese 
FDI will be competitive or complementary. In Sudan, five large Sudan-based 
companies were involved in provision of transport, feeder roads construction, 
civil work, and seismic survey services. In turn, some of these firms, notably 
Hijilig Oil Service and Danfodio Ho, sub-contracted numerous local providers. 
These two firms also worked jointly with other China-based companies in 
providing service for the construction of the Marawi Dam. Danfodio Holdings, 
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which is the largest commercial and construction company in Sudan with 12 
subsidies, has implemented 35 contracts with Chinese firms. The company even 
internationalized in a joint venture with China's Transtech Engineering to build 
a US$634 million railway project in Mauritania. About 31 of the licensed 
private Chinese firms enter into joint ventures with Sudanese counterparts and 
hence contributed to strengthen them. Some of the incoming firms operate in 
processing imported inputs and components for business-drumming-up industry. 
Their activities include advertisement designs, business logo and paper designs, 
as well as ICT components assembly. A niche urban market is created for 
numerous local firms to engage in. Some of the local firms already started 
similar activities and benefiting from the markets for cheap raw materials 
opened up by the Chinese private firms (Suliman and Badawi, 2010). As a 
broad generalization it could be said that China’s FDI is more complementing 
with domestic firms than competing in Sudan. 
     The story is different in the case of Madagascar. One of the crucial issues is 
the ownership of Chinese investment companies by multinational groups. The 
distribution of companies by activity sector shows one of the specificities of 
Chinese investments in Madagascar. In fact, contrary to the distribution of FDI 
stock, the trade sector represents 65% of Chinese FDI companies. This 
phenomenon shows the existence of numerous small scale investors in this 
sector which subsequently encourages the migration of Chinese into 
Madagascar and a flooding of Chinese products. The weak percentage of 
ownership to a multinational group in this sector supports this fact. After the 
trade sector, comes the manufacturing sector with 17% of Chinese enterprises. 
Nevertheless, a weak involvement of locals in these investments was noted. In 
fact, only 35% of Chinese FDIs recorded local involvement. The situation is 
worse when the manufacturing sector is considered. Only 23% of the industries, 
where there is Chinese ownership, record local involvement. Notwithstanding 
that the Chinese FDI stock hardly represents 3% of the entire sector stock. There 
is therefore a phenomenon of exclusion of locals in this sector. Moreover, the 
larger part of investments in the construction and public works sector is made 
by only one company of the branch type, entirely owned by one non-resident 
investor (Razafindravonona et al., 2010). Chinese investment can therefore be 
regarded as competitive in this country. 
     A similar finding was also reported in Angola. For example, adjacent to all 
the activity in the construction sector, there has been a noticeable trickling of 
Chinese small and micro enterprises in Angola. Most of the operations are 
minor business ventures, predominantly in the retail sector but also increasingly 
in the restaurant business. With the influx of Chinese-made construction 
material, household appliances, and other fast-moving consumer goods, Chinese 
operations are also visible in the logistics and freight forwarding sectors. 
Interestingly, a growing trend in Luanda is the prominence of Chinese-owned 
internet cafés (Kiala and Corkin, 2009). 
 
Quality of Chinese construction. The Chinese have increased their 
participation in the construction sector in Africa. The range of infrastructure 
projects that the Chinese are involved in in Africa clearly illustrates the Chinese 
approach of combining business and political objectives. For example, projects 
such as the construction of the National Malaria Centre, and Central Statistical 
Offices were given as Aid, the construction was carried out by Chinese 
companies, which was supported by the Chinese State institutions. The 
increased involvement of the Chinese in the roads construction sector could be 
reflective of the competitiveness of Chinese firms, which are reported to provide 
good quality projects at a price discount of 25% to 50% compared to other 
foreign investors. The Chinese are able to compete favorably on account of 
lower profit margins, access to much cheaper capital, employment of low-paid 
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staff, use of Chinese materials, limited attention to environmental impacts, 
access to hard currency premium paid by the Chinese government, and Chinese 
government provided subsidies (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). 
     Nevertheless, the high Chinese involvement in the construction sector is not 
going on without complaints from Ethiopia. For example, the bulk of the 
complaints are related to the quality of the construction in Ethiopia which is 
considered low quality. In addition, the equipment and machinery for 
construction purpose are imported free of duties and tariffs due to the incentive 
scheme that the government has set up to develop infrastructure. Chinese use 
this opportunity to import technically outdated equipment which after the 
projects in Ethiopia are completed, invariably does not yield any significant 
services (Geda and Meske, 2010). 
 
Supportive Chinese enterprise in Africa. In its engagement with Africa, 
China is not only accessing the much needed natural resources, but also 
bringing complementary Chinese enterprises in Africa, sometimes to the 
displeasure of African countries. For instance, there has been a growth in the 
number of Chinese banks operating in Africa. By having Chinese suppliers and 
clients on the ground, the risk to Chinese banks is reduced. In some cases, the 
Chinese banks have partnered with African Banks. Knowledge of the local 
market is imperative and investment decisions are often driven by cultural, 
linguistic and economic ties. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) purchase of shares in Standard Bank (ICBC’s 20% share in SA Standard 
Bank) is one such step toward enhancing its presence in Africa. Based on the 
strong position of Standard Bank in Africa, the bank will help ICBC serve its 
corporate customers in Africa and Standard Bank will use the capital to expand 
its footprint, with US$450 million of capital being earmarked to support organic 
African growth (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). In Madagascar, Chinese 
companies employed 6,041 people in 2006. This figure represents 10.7% 
compared to the total labour force employed by firms in FDI in 2006. However, 
over 90% of these jobs are from the Chinese subsidiary companies. This can 
partly be explained by the high number of Chinese companies created under this 
arrangement (Razafindravonona, et al., 2010). 
 
Box 3: Saving Angola from debt trap 
 
Angola’s war for independence became an East–West conflict after Portugal 
abruptly gave up power in 1975. The Soviet Union and Cuba stepped in to 
support the new socialist government. The United States and apartheid South 
Africa aided the rebels. With the end of the Cold War, Angola’s proxy struggle 
morphed into a fight for control over blood diamonds, natural gas, and oil. The 
death in battle of the sixty-seven year-old rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 
finally allowed Angolans to end more than forty years of war and limp toward 
something resembling normalcy. The Angolan government financed the war 
with a shadowy system of off-budget accounts that sometimes sloshed with oil 
revenues and sometimes ran dry. Over the years, the once Marxist leadership 
grew wealthy on a toxic diet of oil money and kickbacks from weapon sales. 
“Corruption is widespread throughout society,” the IMF wrote in a report 
leaked to the press. Ten out of every fifty infants born in Angola died before 
reaching their fifth birthday. 
     As the war drew to an end, Angola was badly behind on its debts. They 
owed more than two billion dollars to the Paris Club, the nineteen wealthy 
creditor nations that meet informally to decide on bilateral debt issues. But 
they also owed more than eight billion to other creditors, some (such as a 
group of Russians) even shadier than the Angolan government itself. These 
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money lenders were clamoring for payment; some tried to seize government 
assets outside the country. 
     Enter China. The story that follows has some of the flavor of the classic 
1950 film Rashomon, in which an encounter in the woods is retold, very 
differently, through the eyes of each participant. The conventional wisdom 
goes something like this. After the war, the IMF and the West decide to clean 
up Angola. The IMF insists that Angola improve oil revenue transparency and 
open its tangled accounts for inspection. Backed into a corner by 2004, the 
Angolans are about to agree, when China steps in, offering Angola billions of 
dollars of aid. Flush with cash, Angola turns its back on the IMF, taking 
China’s offer, which comes with no strings attached. “Angola is avoiding 
pressure to clean up corruption thanks to aid from China,” concludes a typical 
news item. Reports on China in Africa rarely fail to mention this cautionary 
tale. It is always obvious who plays the villain. 
 
Source: Brautigam, D. 2009. The dragon’s gift: the real story of China in 
Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
5.5     Implications of Chinese investment for the domestic economy 
 
Support to dictatorial regimes. Chinese FDI has also been alleged to be at the 
expense of safeguarding civil liberties as they tend to deal with governments 
irrespective of their democratic credentials, and have in the worst cases been 
accused of supporting dictatorial regimes (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009). For 
example, in 2005, an explosion due to unsafe working conditions in a Chinese 
copper mine in Chambishi, Zambia killed 46 workers. Zambian president, 
Rupiah Banda, and the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry stood behind 
the Chinese corporation, leading trade unions, workers, politicians, and ordinary 
Zambians to protest that President Banda was taking sides with the Chinese. In 
the long run, such a policy of disregard may trigger a political backlash. In the 
event that dictatorial governments are overthrown by their people, as has been 
seen in cases such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria, China is usually seen as 
an accomplice that helped to sustain and perpetuate the ruthless regimes. 
Ultimately, this complicity could prove counter-productive for Chinese 
investment relations in Africa. Another noticeable approach under this scenario 
is for China to grant aid packages to dictatorial regimes in Africa with no strings 
attached. This has allowed the oppressive dictatorial regimes in Africa to 
subvert and survive Western efforts to initiate political reform. For example, 
while Western nations have attempted to pass a UN arms embargo on the 
Sudanese government to stop the genocide in Darfur, China has sold US$24 
million worth of arms and US$57 million worth of vehicles and equipment to 
Sudan. In Zimbabwe, Western sanctions to bring about reform were likewise 
undermined by China’s support to President Robert Mugabe’s regime in the 
form of US$200 million worth of military vehicles and equipment (Hu, 2011). 
     The relationship between China and Sudan was a central focus of human 
rights activism in the period leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Mia 
Farrow, George Clooney, and other celebrities targeted China as the main 
“enabler” of a situation labeled genocide by the United States. Their story was 
necessarily simple: China’s purchase of Sudanese oil enabled Sudan to buy 
Chinese arms, which were used against the Darfur rebels. China seems to have 
thwarted international action to end the violence in Darfur which has enabled 
the Sudanese government to get away with murder. What has China’s role 
been? Mainly investment, arms sales, and political cover. Beijing helped Sudan 
build its own arms factories, supplied the bulk of Sudan’s small arms imports, 
sold military aircraft to Sudan and energetically defended its military 
cooperation with Sudan’s government. There is some evidence that arms 
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supplied by the Chinese to Khartoum have been used in Darfur, although 
Beijing claims its arms transfers to Khartoum are legal and follow the terms of 
the UN embargo (Brautigam, 2009). 
 
African countries investment in China. It is natural to ask whether there are 
prospects for African investment in China since most of the investments are 
coming from China to Africa. African countries investment in China has been 
few and far between. For example, Angola’s main investor abroad is Sonangol, 
which has embarked on an ambitious endeavour to diversify the country’s 
portfolio investments. Sonangol’s only capital interest in China thus far has 
been in the establishment of China Sonangol International Holding (CSIH) in 
2004. Angola is currently in no position to invest in the Chinese market like 
most of the world’s leading businesses and MNCs. In 2005, Angola’s diamond 
company Endiama partnered with a Chinese firm and formed Endiama China. 
However, the venture was short-lived and was annulled in early 2007. These 
ventures are the only cases of Angolan investment in China (Kiala and Corkin, 
2009). 
     A few Mauritian firms also made incursions to China due to a wide range of 
incentives for doing business in China. These include a range of fiscal 
incentives such as low tax rates and maximum applicable tax holidays; 
presumed foreign tax credits for MHCs, resulting in an effective tax of 3% in 
Mauritius; tax refunds on re-invested dividends; and tax-efficient lease 
financing facilities. These incentives have proved a catalyst in driving Mauritian 
FDI to China, which increased from US$119,000 in 1994 to US$1.5 billion in 
2008. This phenomenal increase in Mauritius’ outward investment in China has 
propelled Mauritius into the ranks of the top ten largest sources of FDI into 
China. In 2008, Mauritian FDI accounted for 1.62% of China’s total FDI 
inflows.1 The increase can be attributed to the investment activities of a major 
company, namely Compagnie Mauricienne de Textile International Trading Ltd 
(CMT). CMT’s success lies in the fact that the company broadened its horizon 
to emerge as an active player in the global scene. The CMT International 
Trading (CMTIT) Ltd. was incorporated as a Freeport Company in Mauritius in 
1995 and started its Freeport activities in January 1996. From its Head Office in 
Mauritius, CMTIT controls operations in its numerous regional subsidiaries. 
Indeed, its branches in Zimbabwe (CMTI Zimbabwe (PVT) Ltd), Madagascar 
(Madatrade Sarl, Madakem Sarl & Plasmad Sarl), China and Hong Kong allow 
distribution of its wide variety of products over the region. This international 
network has always been one of the key strengths of CMTIT Ltd. as it helped to 
provide a better and quicker service to customers (Ancharaz and Nowbutsing, 
2010). Rather than adopt defensive strategies when China emerged as a major 
competitor to the Mauritian textile and clothing industry, the CMT promptly 
invested US$65 million in the construction of an integrated production unit in 
China, in 2005, to exploit China’s large pool of cheap and adaptable labour, 
which constitutes its rivals’ very competitive advantage. The China office of 
CMTIT Ltd. currently boasts a well diversified range of manufactured items—
such as lights and lighting, machinery, office supplies, tools and hardware, and 
toys—on top of a variety of textile products. The business continues to grow 
currently employing more than 1000 workers (Ancharaz and Nowbutsing, 
2010). 
 
Transparency of China investment relations. In certain circumstances, there 
is a lack of transparency in the Sino-African investment relations. This lack of 
transparency in Chinese investment relation packages fuels suspicion. 
Commenting on a US$9 billion loan package, a Congolese opposition leader 
                                                 
1 This share can still be regarded as very low. 
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observed, “…It is incoherent, unbalanced...and forces us to sell off our national 
heritage to the detriment of several generations. It cannot therefore be accepted 
in its current state without being entirely reviewed and submitted to 
international competition…” (Kamwanga, and Koyi, 2009). 
     Similarly Chinese firms are dominating in wining big projects in Ethiopian 
telecommunication and road sectors. One of the biggest Chinese telecom 
company, ZTE, which is owned by the Chinese government, offered the 
Ethiopian telecom a credit (vendor financing) to the tune of US$1.5 billion. This 
offer is conditional on ZTE doing the job without bidding. This credit is perhaps 
equivalent to the total current worth of the Ethiopian telecom monopoly, which 
is also publicly owned. Chinese firms are also dominating both rural and urban 
road construction in Ethiopia. This dominance has been accelerating in the last 
two years. This dominance is partly due to low bid prices offered by the Chinese 
firms and partly owing to the diplomatic and political ties the Chinese 
government made with the Ethiopian government. Provision of financing by the 
Chinese government for its firms in Africa, which Chinese’s firms in turn offer 
as credit in the form of vendor financing during the bidding process, is another 
reason for this success by Chinese firms in Ethiopia. In the transport/road sector, 
Chinese have totally dominated the Ethiopian scene. In general, there are about 
ten Chinese firms engaging in the construction of roads throughout the country; 
responsible for about 60% of the road work currently being carried out in the 
country. Four of the firms dominate the scene by holding nearly 70% of the 
Chinese engagement in the sector. This is a result of the minimum bid price they 
offer and innovative financing mechanisms (Geda and Meske, 2010). 
     In addition, Chinese investment firms hardly disclose information about their 
business. For example, In Ethiopia, a number of Chinese firms were found to 
operate in an activity other than that for which they were granted an investment 
license. A firm with an investment license for manufacturing could be found 
performing service delivery activities. Second, most of the Chinese firm’s 
addresses are different from what are formally registered. Third, most of the 
Chinese did not like to be interviewed. In some cases, they just stop in the 
middle of the interview. Fourth, almost all Chinese firms did not want to 
disclose their capital level. Tsikata (2010) noted that attempts to survey Chinese 
investors have proven unsuccessful in Ghana; the investors are exceedingly 
reluctant to answer questions, despite assurances that the information provided 
would be used to increase benefits to both the investors and the local economy. 
 
Investment is linked to aid and Beijing. One significant characteristic of 
Chinese FDI is that they are closely linked to the Chinese state. This 
characteristic is in sharp contrast to the foreign direct investment from some 
Western countries into Africa, which is almost entirely driven by private 
enterprises. As the level of investment is going up, so too is the level of aid. The 
notion of tying FDI with aid is in line with the Chinese practice of incorporating 
aid as a sign of South-to-South cooperation, a practice which predates the 
present China-African investment relations. The playing field in regard to other 
FDIs is not even, as Chinese companies’ enjoy political and financial backing 
from Beijing (plus cheap labour and technology). The president of the Zambia 
National Farmers Union, Guy Robinson, said, ”Mrs. Makota, these people are 
here to talk about investment.” I said, “Dear Mr. President, we know these 
Chinese investors, there is no level playing field. They are mechanized. They 
sell their produce very cheap in our market because they use very cheap labour. 
I have visited some of their farms. Their vegetables grow enormously big. They 
use human feces!” She shuddered. “We would prefer them to sell wholesale, 
and leave the retail market to local people.” (Brautigam, 2009). In the Nigerian 
case, Chinese investment financing is offered with a relatively large aid 
component in the form of concessionary interest rates and grant element. The 
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investment loans are offered without conditions attached to them as they are 
with loans from the multilateral finance organizations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This allows for domestic policy 
flexibility, although this has been criticized because of poor governance and 
macroeconomic environment in African countries, including Nigeria, which 
may hinder productivity and sustainability of investment (Oyeranti et al., 2010). 
 
 
6     Synthesis of findings 
 
Taking a brief overview of the points in the last section, it is obvious that 
Chinese FDI in Africa is largely determined by the nature of resources available 
in the host economy. In the set of countries where raw materials are available, it 
was noticed that the dominant set of investment in that country is resource-
seeking. It was only in few cases that Chinese FDI was found to be market 
seeking. Resource seeking seems to be driving Chinese FDI. This is certainly 
the case with FDI in oil-rich Angola and Nigeria and in copper-abundant 
Zambia. Less visible though are Chinese investments in leather tanneries and 
shoe production in Ethiopia, and in Ghana’s processed fish industry, capitalizing 
on these country’s long-standing comparative advantages in the respective 
sectors. Furthermore, China’s demand for raw materials may undo Africa’s 
efforts at economic diversification, leaving African countries as enclaves for 
raw materials, and limiting opportunities for sustained development. For 
example, the copper in Zambia is exported to the Chinese market in its raw 
form, and hardly processed internally, this limits Zambia to the raw material 
enclave that it has always been. In addition, these Chinese investments in the 
resource seeking sector are devoid of the expected backward and forward 
linkages to the domestic economy. 
     To the extent that Chinese enterprises in Africa import inputs, such as labour 
from their homeland, there may be limited linkages with local firms, which pose 
negative effects on the local economy. Even in cases where local sources of 
labour are utilized it has been observed that this tends to be on a limited scale, 
with little capacity development, and hardly any opportunities for technology 
transfer. There must be a balance between acquiring new technology and 
creating new jobs. Chinese firms hardly respect local laws which have 
implication for their credibility. The labour standards currently being utilized by 
most Chinese investors in Africa are poor relative to what is acceptable in China 
and the developed world. This has resulted in an uneasy relationship between 
the African locals and the Chinese, which is not desirable for long-term 
engagements. In order to resolve the mistrust, China should encourage or 
mandate Chinese firms working in Africa to hire more local labour, improve 
working conditions, and respect local laws. 
     While China’s relationship with the countries of Africa may strictly not 
qualify as that of a neocolonialist nature (although it will not be surprising if 
eventually we have Sinophone countries in Africa)2, there are critical problems 
in the way it deals with local populations that alienates them and generates 
resentment. In order to maintain its international credibility and support with 
local populations, China should discontinue supporting dictatorial regimes that 
overtly repress its people, especially in terms of the sale of military weapons 
and equipment. It is ultimately in China’s own interest to review its involvement 
in Africa in order to sustain its economic growth and maintain its international 
credibility. The disconnect between the official Chinese government rhetoric of 
                                                 
2 African countries are currently divided in the line of Anglophone (English speaking 
countries), Francophone (French speaking countries), and Lusophone (Portuguese 
speaking countries). 
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win-win agreements and local realities will only entrench and perpetuate distrust 
of the Chinese. It will not take long for the common public to see through the 
veiled Chinese rhetoric of win-win situations that belies its real quest for natural 
resources and political control. China’s support of African rogue governments 
will inevitably harm its reputation on the global stage, reduce its credibility in 
international affairs, and degrade relations with its neighbors. 
     With special economic zones (SEZs) and free trade zones (FTZs), China is 
better able to exploit Africa’s natural resources and produce goods destined for 
both the African market and beyond, as well as opening up a more efficient 
conduit for routing these resources to mainland China to sustain the growth 
momentum back home. However, it is likely that the economic benefits arising 
from the Chinese SEZs and FTZs will be too small relative to the costs incurred 
by government in terms of road infrastructure, utilities, and telecommunication 
networks. Moreover, the SEZs and FTZs will consume a tremendous amount of 
electricity, putting pressure on existing capacity, and inflating the imported oil 
bill. Given these considerations, one wonders do African governments 
conducted a proper feasibility study or an environmental impact assessment 
before allowing these projects to go ahead. The major belief is that the lure of a 
billion-dollar FDI project is great enough to override any other concerns. 
Governments promote the potential economic benefits of a project, and claim 
credit for attracting FDI on such a massive scale. To the extent that the Chinese 
FTZs and SEZs would help revamp an African country’s manufacturing sector, 
they are regarded as valuable. However, an appreciable level of technology 
transfer is yet to be witnessed and assessed. 
     Also, there appears to be limited prospects for African investment in China 
as most of the investment is coming from China to Africa. Only Mauritius and 
Angola have made some limited level of investment in China despite the 
plethora of incentives offered to African countries. This goes to show that 
Chinese investment is lopsided against African countries. There is also lack of 
transparency in most Chinese firms. In some cases, this is due to tax evasion on 
the part of the Chinese investors as they hardly open their books for the 
government. Oyeranti et al. (2010) noted that the positive revenue effect of 
Chinese FDI may not be realized by the Nigerian Government because of the 
possibility for tax evasion/avoidance by Chinese firms coupled with the 
permission to repatriate profits and incomes. . It is therefore also not surprising 
to discover that Chinese FDI in Africa is tied to aid which as earlier noted 
contradict the bulk of FDI from other developed countries that is purely driven 
by private enterprises. Except in the case of Mauritius, most domestic firms in 
Africa have been crowded-out due to the incursion of China into their economy. 
This goes to confirm the competitive nature of Chinese investment in Africa. 
 
 
7     Conclusion 
 
Our case studies review suggests that Chinese investment relations with Africa 
have good, bad and ugly sides. On the good side there exist some potential for 
the SEZs to build linkages with the local economy. However, the linkages will 
be mainly forward, involving logistics, forwarding, and insurance and financial 
services. Backward linkages will be fostered to the extent that the Chinese firms 
contract out transportation and catering services for their employees and sub-
contract with local firms. The bad side includes the employment quota, poor 
labour standard, limited technology transfer, and the quality of Chinese 
construction among others. The ugly side includes tax evasion and support to 
dictatorial regimes in Africa. In order to make African countries more 
competitive, there needs to be more rigorous control of imported goods by 
customs officials with stringent checks on the goods by the Ministry of Trade to 
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be sure that all the necessary duties have been paid, the quality of goods are 
inspected, and that all products imported from China and elsewhere are taxed. 
Chinese companies should be well controlled and the legislation that guides 
their business conduct should be fully enforced. African governments and their 
civil societies need to protect the rights of local communities by saying no, or 
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